
Human Factors in WAAS and LAAS



Daniel L. Welch, Ph.D., CPE
AMTI TAC / FAA ATO-W, Navigation Services
Arlington, VA
20 October 2004

Human Engineering Process Standards


- MIL-HDBK 46855A Human Engineering Program Process and Procedures
- Federal Aviation Administration Human Factors Job Aid
- ANSI/AAMI HE74 2001 Human Factors
 Design Process for Medical Devices
- Salvendy Handbook of Human Factors and Ergonomics
- DEF STAN 00-25 Part 12 Human Factors for Designers of Equipment: Systems



MIL-HDBK-46855A

		ACQUISITION PROGRAM PHASES										
		Mission Feasibility & Concept Formation	Concept Exploration	Program Definition & Risk Reduction	Engineering & Manufacturing Development	Production, Fielding / Deployment & Operational Support						
TYPE OF HE ACTIVITY	Analysis Design & Develop- ment Test & Evalu- ation	MILESTONE										

ACQUISITION PROGRAM &	CONCEPT EXPLORATION		PROGRAM DEFINITION & RISK REDUCTION	ENGINEERING & MANUFACTURING DEVELOPMENT		PRODUCTION/ DEPLOYMENT	
RESEARCH PHASES	BASIC RESEARCH	APPLIED RESEARCH		ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT	ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT		OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS DEPLOYMENT
PHASES							
HUMAN ENGINEERING ACQUISITION FUNCTIONS	Participate in: Experiments, Concept exploration & COEA studies, Mockups, Models, System analyses, Task & workload analyses, Function allocation studies Input to MNS, ORD Biomedicine & life support MPT Maintainability Reliability Safety Health hazard assessment Survivability Systems engineering Logistics support			Task & workload analyses, Function allocation studies, Design, models & mockups Prototypes, Demonstrations Procedures, IPTs	Changes to baseline, Operability, Maintainability, Developmental T&E, Demos, Procedures, IPTs, Design revs. Biomedicine & life sup. Logistics & MPT Publication & manuals Maintainability Health, safety, reliability ISD/training systems Life-cycle costs Developmental T&E		Conduct OT&E, Evaluate ECPs, Modifications
HUMAN ENGINEERING INTERFACES WITH RELATED DISCIPLINES				Biomedicine & life sup. MPT Maintainability Systems engineering ISD/training system design Life-cycle cost estimates Health hazard & safety Survivability			Biomedicine & life support Publications & manuals Maintainability Health, safety MPT ISD/training sys Operational T&E
OBJECTIVES	TECHNOLOGY PAPER RESEARCH STUDIES		CRITICAL ISSUES EVALUATION	ENGINEER EVALUATION DT&E AND OT&E		OPERATIONAL HARDWARE	
DoD PROGRAM MILESTONES Approval of:						on, or Deployment	
			_				




Ergo...

SE / HE Integration Processes give us a *general approach* to our tasks,

But


They can't be dogmatically followed in the specific case.




Two Specific Cases

Wide Area
Augmentation
System

Local Area
Augmentation
System



Two Specific Cases The Impact of Differing Acquisition Realities on the **Human Factors** Tasks, Tools, and Procedures Employed in the Acquisition **Efforts**





Wide-area Reference Station



Ground Earth Station



2 O&M Console





WAAS O&M Console @ NOCC



WAAS Contract History

- August 1995 Wilcox Electric Inc.
- April 1996 Contract Terminated
- May 1996 Hughes Aircraft Co.
 (Raytheon Co.)



- June 1999 Contract Rebaselined
- January 2000 WAAS Integrity Perf. Panel
- August 2000 WAAS Review Board
- November 2001 Contract Rebaselined
- 2004 Contract Rebaselined

Impact on HF

"During this entire period the WAAS program experienced a number of contractor, scheduling, funding profile, and operations and maintenance concept difficulties.

Individually and collectively, these difficulties negatively impacted HF efforts and participation in system design."

Impact on HF

- Initially Wilcox had a full-up HF program
- HF de-emphasized at contract termination (Due to life-cycle contractor O&M support)
- HF "on back-burner" August 2001
 (To concentrate on safety & integrity issues)
- WAAS commissioned July 2003
 (O&M by FAA vs. contractor)
- IOC to FOC Transition (Sep 04)(HW & SW improvements)



Impacts on WAAS HF

- Contract history
- Safety and integrity problems
- Support concept changes
- Congressional and airline pressure
- Conscious decisions vs. "bad blood," lack of concern, misunderstanding HF



Impacts on WAAS HF

- Contract history
- Safety and integrity problems
- Support concept changes










Current HF Efforts

- WAAS, as it exists today, contains a number of HF issues which need to be addressed
- HF for WAAS now consists of identifying and correcting those issues vs. "designing them out"
- Much like US nuclear industry post-TMI
- HF is an exercise in change control.

WAAS HFE Tasks

- Initial Analyses
 (Should Have Been Done Long Ago)
 - Task Inventories
 - Criticality Analysis
 - Critical Task Analysis
 - Critical Design Considerations



WAAS HFE Tasks

- Problem Identification & WHAIL
 - Mockups, Prototypes, Simulations
 - Operators & Maintainers Users Groups
- Solution Development
 - Users Groups
 - HF Working Group
- Solution Implementation (WCCB) & Tracking
- Change Control Monitoring

WAAS Summary


- Problems in the Contracts World Led To Problems with HF
- HF "Shut Off" While System Developed
- Retrofit HF Improvements to Existing WAAS







LAAS Configuration



Contract History

- April 1997 Formation of GIPs
 - CAT I LAAS Type Acceptance/Certification
- April 2002 RFO for Full-Up LAAS Development Program to CAT II / III
- June 2002 Acquisition Strategy Changed to a Phased Development
 - Phase I CAT I Design to CDR
 - Phase II LRIP at 6 Operational Sites
 - Phase III CAT II / III Development and Approaches at Additional Sites

Contract History

- Leverage GIP Efforts and Results to Phase-In CAT I LAAS, Then Transition to CAT II / III
- April 2003 Contract Award to Honeywell
- Jan 2004 Integrity Problems and Concentration on Integrity Issues
- Feb 2004 HF Activities Shut Down
- Mar 2004 Program De-Scoped
 - Integrity Design Only LAAS Integrity Panel (LIP)

Contract History

- Oct 2004 3-Phase Effort
 - Phase 1 3 Honeywell Beta-LAASs to Micronesia
 - Phase 2 Merge Beta-LAAS with Integrity Panel Work
 - Phase 3 Category II / III Development



Initial HFE Activity

- GIP
 - Prototype MDT & ATCU Demonstrations
 - Evaluated Against Exit Criteria
 - HFDG not Process
- Development Contract
 - Acquisition Documentation & Proposal Evaluation



Contract HFE Activity

- Phase I Acquisition -- Conventional HF Program
 - System Analysis (FFDs)
 - Task Inventory
 - Criticality Analysis
 - CTA & CDC Development
 - User Groups
 - Working Groups
 - ATCU User Interface Development & Testing



ATCU Concept Interface Screens Flow CA-1 Constellation Alert Pop-Up sp-CS-1 PA-2 Predicted Constellation Alert SA-1 Pop-Up #2 Service Alert Pop-Up PA-1 Predicted RS-1 **Constellation Alert** Pop-Up #1 Return-to-Service Pop-Up #1 MD-1 MD-2 **Active Runway** All Runway Ends Ends SP-1 RS-2 Save Prompt Return-to-Service Pop-Up Pop-Up #2 AA-1 TM-1 CP-1 CS-1 Alarm Test Mode Complete Screen Pop-Up Prompt Control Pop-Up Pop-Up CC-1 Note: Only MD-1, MD-2 and CS-1 are screens - all Configuration other elements are pop-ups. It is possible to have SA-Select SV-2 SV-1 Pop-Up 1, SV-2, and PA-2 superimposed on MD-1 or MD-2 Service Alert Service Alert simultaneously. AA-1, TM-1, and CA-1 will pop-up as (VDB) soon as their initiating conditions are met, regardless of Pop-Up #2 Pop-Up #1 implied flow. SV-1, and PA-1will pop-up as soon as their initiating conditions are met, unless AA-1 or TM-1 are displayed.

CAT.I - Display Active - IAD

4

15

Primary:

South Tower

Time:

14:23:13

Flow:

North

6L

30R

6R

30L

9

All Ends

Control

CAT.I - Display All - IAD

22 15 33

Primary:

South Tower

Time:

08:43:29

Flow:

North

Active Ends

Control

CAT.I - Display Active - IAD

Predicted Constellation Alert

Current Time: 08:24:50

Predicted Start Time: 08:25:44

Predicted End Time: 08:26:44

Time to Alert

00:55

Acknowledge

Control

ATCU User Testing

- 4 Nationwide ATCs
- Lab Testing
 - -21 Task Scenarios
 - 1 End State Error (Inconsequential)
- Focus Group Discussion
 - User Acceptance with 13Recommendations
 - -8 Unresolved Issues



Contract HFE Activity

- Phase I Acquisition -- Conventional HF Program
 - System Analysis (FFDs)
 - Task Inventory
 - Criticality Analysis
 - CTA & CDC Development
 - User Groups
 - Working Groups
 - ATCU User Interface Development & Testing



Feb / Mar 2004 Drop Back 10 and Punt

- Integrity Only
- "Fluid Requirements" -- ATCU
 - No Additional Glass in Tower
- Maintenance Monitoring Concept
 - NIMS
 - Alerting Techniques Remote Status Panel



ATCU Glass in Tower

- No New Glass In Tower
- Potential Solutions
 - Integrate with Existing System
 - No Existing System Meets New Security Reqs.
 - Develop New Display and Include NAV Systems
 - What Systems?
 - Who Pays
- Revisit ACTU Requirements



Maintenance Monitoring

- NIMS
 - Does Not Currently Exist



- May Not Exist For Some Time
- Currently an Un-Manned System
 - Alert at ATCU?
 - Pilot First to Know
- Alerting Techniques
 - Remote Status Panels



Impact on LAAS HFE

- Post-GIP, Traditional Development Attempted
- Realities Outside of the Program Office
- Changing Requirements
- Currently System Development Without HF ->
 Following WAAS's Lead
- Deal with 2 "System" Issues
- No HW / SW Design Until Program Re-Starts

LAAS Summary


- Nice Try, But No Cigar
- Put Out HF Fires
- Attempt to Re-Start "Traditional"
 Development
- Not Holding Our Breath






Conclusion

- Texts books, graduate courses and academic papers provide a theoretical ideal of how HFE should be integrated into the system engineering process.
- HF practitioners know it never happens that way.
- The reality is that forces outside of our control constantly impact what we do, how and when we do it, and most importantly, why we do it.











Wide Area Augmentation System



Local Area Augmentation System

FAA Wide Area Augmentation System

